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NOTES
SUPREME COURT'S HIGHER STANDARD OF REVIEW
INVALIDATES TREAS. REG. 1.1563-1(a)(3) AND NARROWS
SCOPE OF BROTHER-SISTER CONTROLLED GROUPS-
UNITED STATES V. VOGEL FERTILIZER COMPANY
Congress has enacted various tax provisions to stimulate the growth and
development of small corporations.' One significant example is the graduated
corporate tax structure.2 This structure subjects the first $100,000 of cor-
porate earnings to lower tax rates, thereby, reducing the tax burden on small
income corporations. Two or more corporations which are substantially
owned by the same five or fewer shareholders, however, may be classified
as component members of a "brother-sister controlled group" and, conse-
quently, required to share numerous tax benefits otherwise available to
each corporation individually.' Section 1563(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue
1. For a general discussion of the tax aspects of the closely held corporation, see
Dan, An Updated Analysis of Tax Planning for Closely Held Corporations and Their
Shareholders, 56 TAXES 897 (1978); Eustice, The Tax Reform Act of 1976: Loss Carryovers
and Other Corporate Changes, 32 TAX L. REv. 113 (1977); Monyek, Withdrawing Funds from
Closely Held Corporations (At the Lowest Cost), 49 TAXES 802 (1971); Ness, Tax Developments
Affecting Closely Held Corporations, I J. CORP. TAX'N 71 (1974); Note, Taxation: Tax Aspects
of Incorporating the Closely Held Corporation, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 280 (1975).
2. I.R.C. §§ 11 (a)-(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) imposes an annual tax on the taxable
income of every corporation. For 1982 and subsequent years the tax is the sum of:
(1) 15 percent (16 percent for taxable years beginning in 1982) of so much of the
taxable income as does not exceed $25,000;
(2) 18 percent (19 percent for taxable years beginning in 1982) of so much of the
taxable income as exceeds $25,000 but does not exceed $50,000;
(3) 30 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $50,000 but does not
exceed $75,000;
(4) 40 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $75,00 but does not
exceed $100,000; plus
(5) 46 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $100,000.
Id.
For tax years 1979 through 1981 the 15% and 18% rates were 17% and 20%, respectively.
Id. Prior to 1979 the normal and surtax corporate tax structure was in effect. For a discussion
of this system, see infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
3. I.R.C. § 1561(a) treats a brother-sister controlled group of corporations as a single tax-
payer for purposes of the graduated corporate tax system. 1.R.C. § 1561(a)(1) (Law. Co-op.
1982). In addition, § 1561(a) limits a brother-sister controlled group to a single accumulated
earnings credit under I.R.C. § § 535(c)(2)-(3) and to one small business deduction for life in-
surance companies under § 804(a)(3) and § 809(d)(10). Examples of other limited deductions
and credits which are applied to a brother-sister controlled group as a single corporation in-
clude: the $25,000 investment credit limitation under § 46(a)(6); the limitation on amount of
used property eligible for the investment tax credit under § 48(c)(3)(C); the $10,000 tax preference
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Code' (Code) objectively defines a brother-sister controlled group with a
two-part test.5
Two or more corporations are members of a brother-sister controlled group
if five or fewer persons6 own 7 at least eighty percent of the total voting
power or stock value of each corporation and more than fifty percent of
the total voting power or stock value of each corporation considering only
each person's "identical stock ownership" 8 in the corporations.' In an attempt
to clarify an apparent ambiguity regarding the application of the eighty per-
cent test, the Treasury Department issued Treasury Regulation section
exemption under § 58(b) from the add-on minimum tax; and the first year bonus depreciation
deduction under § 179.
For a discussion of other Code sections treating a brother-sister controlled group as a single
taxpayer, see Golub & Weber, What Supreme Court's Liberal Decision on Controlled Groups
Means to Practitioners, 27 TAX'N FOR ACCT. 208, 208 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Golub &
Weber]; Welz & Minasian, Supreme Court in Vogel Voids IRS' 80% Brother-Sister Group
Test: Wide Impact Seen, 56 J. TAX'N 202, 204 n.20, 205 (1982).
4. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1974). Unless otherwise indicated, all references to
"Code" or "section(s)" refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended.
5. The text of I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) provides, in relevant part:
Brother-sister Controlled Group - Two or more corporations if 5 or fewer persons
who are individuals, estates or trusts own. . stock possessing-
(A) at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the total value of shares of all classes
of the stock of each corporation, and
(B) more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote or more than 50 percent of the total value of shares of all classes
of stock of each corporation, taking into account the stock ownership of each per-
son only to the extent such stock ownership is identical with respect to each such
corporation.
I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1974).
6. For purposes of § 1563(a)(2) the word "persons" includes individuals, estates, or trusts.
I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1974).
7. In computing the 80% and 50% tests under § 1563(a)(2), stock ownership includes stock
owned directly or indirectly. Indirect ownership is determined under the attribution rules of
§ 1563(e). I.R.C. § 1563(e) (Law. Co-op. 1974). For a thorough discussion of the application
of these complicated attribution rules, see J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXA-
TION, CODE COMMENTARY § 1563:3 (rev. ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS]; Slayen &
Ayers, Tax Planning for Multiple Corporations: Definitions and Applications, 8 TAx ADVISOR
396, 400-01 (1977). For suggestions on circumventing the attribution rules through gifts, sales,
and redemptions, see Chiasson, Tax Advantages of Multiple Corporations After Vogel Fer-
tilizer, 13 TAX ADVISOR 388, 392 (1982).
In addition, § 1563(c) excludes certain types of stock. For example, nonvoting preferred stock
and treasury stock are not counted for purposes of the 80% and 50% requirements. I.R.C.
§ 1563(c)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1974). For a general discussion regarding other types of excluded
stock, see MERTENS, supra, at § 1563:2.
8. The meaning of "identical stock ownership" is best illustrated by an example. If A
owns 50% of corporation X and 20% of corporation Y, A's identical stock ownership with
respect to each corporation is 20%. Similarly, if B owns 50% of corporation X and 0% of
corporation Y, B's identical stock ownership with respect to each corporation is 0%.
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1.1563-1(a)(3)."' This regulation provides that a person's stock interest may
be included in the eighty percent ownership computation even though that
individual does not own stock in each corporation comprising the alleged
brother-sister controlled group.' The Treasury's construction of the eighty
percent test has come under judicial scrutiny, and the issue of its validity
has divided the lower federal courts.'" The Supreme Court's recent decision
in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Company,'3 resolved the conflict con-
trary to the Treasury's construction by holding that a person must own stock
in each corporation of the alleged brother-sister controlled group before that
person may be included for purposes of the eighty percent ownership test.
A close examination reveals that the Vogel decision significantly affects
9. The application of this technical provision is illustrated by the following example:
Percentage of Stock Percentage of
Ownership Identical Stock Ownership
(80% Test) (50% Test)
Corporations
SHAREHOLDERS P Q R
A 30% 75% 50% 30%
B 70% 25% 50% 25%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 55%
Corporations P, Q, and R are members of a brother-sister controlled group. Together A and
B own 100% of each corporation and thus satisfy the 80% ownership test of I.R.C. §
1563(a)(2)(A). In addition, the more than 50% identical stock ownership requirement of §
1563(a)(2)(B) is satisfied because collectively A and B have a 55% identical stock interest in
each corporation. Shareholder A's stock interest in each corporation is identical to the extent
of 30%. Similarly, B's stock interest in each corporation is identical to the extent of 25%.
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a) (1972).
11. Id. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
12. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have
upheld the regulation as a reasonable construction of the statute. See, e.g., Allen Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 614 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1980); T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532
(8th Cir. 1977); Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the United
States Court of Claims, and the United States Tax Court have invalidated the regulation by
holding that § 1563(a)(2) was intended to apply only where each person in the five or fewer
group owns stock in each corporation. See, e.g., Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner,
632 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1980); Vogel Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 497 (Ct. Cl.
1980), aff'd, __ U.S. __ , 102 S. Ct. 821 (1982). The United States Tax Court has held
its position firmly despite reversals by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Fourth, and Eighth Circuits. See, e.g., Davidson Chevrolet Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M.
(CCH) 299 (1979); Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 355 (1979), rev'd, 614
F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1980); Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1485
(1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1980); Baloian Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 620 (1977),
appeal docketed, Nos. 78-2438, 78-2508 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 1978); Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 966 (1976), rev'd per curiam, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); T.L. Hunt v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 966 (1976),
rev'd, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977).
13. __ U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 821 (1982).
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two areas of law. First, the majority's analysis in Vogel indirectly confirms
a recent trend toward subjecting interpretative regulations to a higher stan-
dard of judicial review. More specifically, the Vogel opinion suggests that
interpretative regulations which are issued contemporaneously with the enact-
ment of a Code section and which construe an ambiguous statutory defini-
tion rather than a broad statutory term deserve little, if any, deference.
Second, the Court's narrow construction of section 1563(a)(2) will enable
many close corporations to avoid classification as component members of
a brother-sister controlled group, thus resulting in substantial tax savings
to these corporations.
BACKGROUND
The Development and Statutory Scheme of Section 1563(a)(2)
Since the enactment of the surtax exemption in 1950," the corporate tax
scheme has been consistently structured to reduce the tax burden on small
businesses. Before the present graduated tax structure was enacted in 1978,'"
the corporate tax scheme imposed a normal tax on all corporate earnings
plus an additional surtax on taxable income exceeding a $25,000 surtax
exemption.' 6 Abuse soon arose, however, because large corporations were
able to obtain multiple surtax exemptions by subdividing and forming multiple
corporations.I7
Prior to 1964, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) used a subjective test
to curtail the abuse of surtax exemptions by multiple incorporation."8 The
14. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 15(b), 64 Stat. 915 (repealed 1978). The surtax exemp-
tion was created to give small business as a tax advantage by reducing the corporate tax rate
on the first $25,000 of corporate earnings. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 97,
reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 2165.
15. Act of November 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 2820 (codified at
I.R.C. § 11 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982)).
16. The Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 15(b), 64 Stat. 915 (repealed 1978), imposed a
normal tax of 23% on all taxable corporate income and a surtax of 20% on taxable corporate
income in excess of $25,000. Thus, the value of the surtax exemption was 20% of $25,000
or $5,000.
17. The House Ways and Means Committee Report noted that "large organizations have
been able to obtain substantial benefits .. .by dividing the organization's income among a
number of related corporations." H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 98, reprinted in
1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 2166. See also H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong.,
Ist Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313, 1425 (noting that some medium
and large enterprises have taken advantage of the lower rates afforded small business by organizing
their corporate structure in the form of multiple corporations).
18. I.R.C. §§ 269, 482, and 1551 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1982), formed the basis of
the Government's subjective test. Section 269 provides that where an individual or corporation
acquires or acquired control of a corporation for the "purpose" of avoiding federal income
tax, the Secretary of the Treasury may disallow any resulting deduction, credit, or allowance
which such person or corporation would not otherwise have enjoyed. "Control" constituted
ownership of at least 50% of the voting stock or value of stock of the corporation. Id. § 269.
Section 482 authorizes the Secretary to allocate deductions, credits, or allowances among two
or more corporations controlled by the same interest, if necessary to prevent the evasion of
taxes or to clearly reflect the income of the corporations. Id. § 482. Section 482, however,
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taxpayers, however, were often successful in withstanding an IRS challenge' 9
because the Commissioner had the burden of establishing a tax avoidance
purpose for the taxpayer's use of multiple corporations."0 In 1964, Congress
responded to the continued abuse of multiple surtax exemptions with the
enactment of Code sections 1561 and 1563.21 Section 1561 limits a controlled
does not define "control." Finally, § 1551 empowers the Secretary to disallow a transferee
corporation a surtax exemption and an accumulated earnings credit where: (1) a corporation
transfers non-monetary property to the transferee corporation; (2) the transferee corporation
was created for the purpose of acquiring such property or was not actively engaged in business
at the time of the transfer; (3) the transferee corporation is controlled by the transferor cor-
poration or its shareholders; and (4) the transferee cannot "establish by the clear preponderance
of the evidence" that the securing of the surtax exemption or accumulated earnings credit was
not a "major purpose" of the transfer. Id. § 1551. Section 1551 defines "control" with substan-
tially the same language as § 1563(a)(2) defines a brother-sister controlled group. See supra
note 5 (quoting the text of § 1563(a)(2)). Although § § 269, 482, and '1551 are still in effect,
they are rarely employed because the objective tests of §§ 1561-1563 have proven more effec-
tive. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 102 S. Ct. 821, 829 n.9 (1982)(noting that §§
269, 482, and 1551 are still in effect but rarely utilized); H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313, 1427 (the enactment of I.R.C.
§ 1563 was not intended to affect the application of §§ 269, 482, and 1551 if the multiple
corporations formed to avoid taxes).
For a detailed analysis of how §§ 269, 482, and 1551 have been applied to limit the abuse
of multiple incorporations, see Carruthers, The Treasury's Attack Upon the Tax Benefits of
the Multi-Corporate Complex, 28 INST. FED. TAX'N 555 (1970); Dreher, Federal Income Tax
Aspects of Multiple Corporations, 9 Hous. L. REV. 8, 15-19 (1971); Thomas, Brother-Sister
Multiple Corporations-The Tax Reform Act of 1969 Reformed by Regulation, 28 TAX L.
REV. 65, 66-67 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Thomas].
19. Under these subjective provisions, courts generally allow the taxpayer multiple benefits
if there is a valid business purpose for operating in the form of multiple corporations. The
most common "business purposes" justifying the use of multiple corporations include differences
in location, business activities, and the need for limited liability. See, e.g., Green Light Co.
v. United States, 405 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1968) (I.R.C. § 269 inapplicable because corporations
were created in different geographic locations and a need existed for limited liability); Sno-
Frost, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 1058 (1959) (avoiding tax was not a "major purpose"
of creating another corporation where there was a need for limited liability and the corporation
handled product:; requiring different merchandising methods). For a discussion of business pur-
poses advanced in various cases and the success of each, see F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS
LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.05 at 48 (2d ed. 1971 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL];
Cuddihy, Obtaining Multiple Deductions and Credits for Multiple Corporations, 1961 TUL.
TAX INST. 564; Ekman, How Many Corporations Can Conduct a Business?, 19 INST. FED.
TAX'N 391 (1961); Emmanual & Lipoff, Commissioner v. Corporate Complex: An Expanding
Attack, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 352 (1962-63); Paley, Multiple Corporations Face Ever-Increasing
Attack; Realty Development Vulnerable, 18 J. TAX'N 130 (1963).
20. See supra note 18. Under § 269 the Commissioner is required to establish that the
acquisition was for the "principal purpose" of evading federal income taxes. I.R.C. § 269
(Law Co-op. 1974). Section 482 requires the Commissioner to demonstrate that disallowance
of a deduction is necessary to prevent the evasion of taxes. Id. § 482. Section 1551, however,
places the burden on the taxpayer to establish "by clear preponderance of the evidence" that
the securing of a surtax exemption or accumulated earnings credit was not a "major purpose"
of the transfer. Id. § 1551.
21. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 19 (current version at
I.R.C. §§ 1561-1563 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1982)). For commentary discussing the develop-
ment of I.R.C. §§ 1561-1563, see Comment, Brother-Sister Controlled Groups: Tax Court Stands
Firm In The Face of Reversal, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 543 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Tax Court
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group of corporations to a single surtax exemption,2" and section 1563 deter-
mines which corporations are members of a "controlled group." 3 These
sections set forth an objective test which permits one surtax exemption per
group of small corporations that are component members of a large enter-
prise, while still affording the full surtax exemption to bona fide small
businesses."
Although Congress replaced the surtax and surtax exemption with the pre-
sent graduated corporate tax scheme in 1978, Code sections 1561 through
1563 are still relevant today. Like the surtax exemption, the graduated rate
structure favors small income corporations and, thus, encourages large cor-
porations to operate, in form, as a number of smaller corporations. Section
1561 deters abuse of this rate structure by dividing benefits of the lower
tax rates equally among the individual control group members unless they
consent to an apportionment plan providing otherwise.2 "
The substantive problem under either the surtax or graduated tax schemes
is objectively defining a controlled group of corporations. Section 1563(a)(2)
originally provided that two or more corporations were component members
of a brother-sister controlled group if at least eighty percent of each cor-
poration was owned by the same person.2 " Because this narrow provision
was easily circumvented, the Treasury Department proposed an amendment
Stands Firm]; Note, The Brother-Sister Controlled Group Under LR.C., § 1563(a)(2), 67 VA.
L. REV. 751 (1981).
See generally Note, Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner. Definitional Requirements
of the Multiple Corporation for Purposes of Exclusion from Surtax Exemptions, 32 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 461, 476-78 (1978) (criticizing these sections as a defective mechanical device).
22. I.R.C. § 1561 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1982). Prior to 1975, however, a component
member of a controlled group of corporations could obtain a full $25,000 surtax exemption
by paying a six percent penalty tax on its first $25,000 of income. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 19 (phased out 1969 through 1975) (formerly codified at
I.R.C. § 1562 (Law. Co-op. 1974)). For an analysis of the mechanics of this provision, see White,
The Tax Reform Act of 1969: Demise of Multiple Surtax Exemptions- When Too Much of
a Good Thing Proved Its Own Undoing, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1353, 1356-60 (1970)[hereinafter
cited as White].
23. I.R.C. § 1563 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1982). In addition to a brother-sister con-
trolled group, § 1563(a) defines a parent-subsidiary controlled group and a "combined group".
See id. § 1563(a).
24. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 133-36, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2027, 2166; H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong. Ist Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313, 1426. Sections 1561-1563 apply despite legitimate business
reasons for operating in a multiple corporate form. Id.
25. I.R.C. § 1561(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982), as amended by Act of November 6,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 301(b)(19)(A), 92 Stat. 2820, 2823. See also supra note 3.
26. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 19 (amended 1969) (current
version at I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1974)). The statute defined a brother-sister con-
trolled group as:
[t]wo or more corporations if stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total com-
bined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent
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expanding the scope of section 1563(a)(2)." The proposal increased the eighty
percent ownership group from one to five or fewer persons and added a
fifty percent identical ownership test.28 According to the Treasury Depart-
ment's General Explanation, the fifty percent test insures that this expanded
definition applies only to corporations operating as one economic unit.29 Con-
gress adopted the Treasury's proposal verbatim in 1969. 30
As amended, however, the eighty percent test of section 1563(a)(2) con-
tained an inherent ambiguity. It was unclear whether a shareholder must
own stock in each corporation of the alleged brother-sister controlled group
before that person's stock interest could be considered for purposes of the
eighty percent test." Shortly after the 1969 amendment was enacted, the
Treasury Department issued Temporary Regulation section 13.16-1(a)32 which
provided that the eighty percent and fifty percent tests of section 1563(a)(2)
could be satisfied by five or fewer persons considered "singly or in
combination."" An example set forth in the temporary regulation
demonstrated that the phrase "singly or in combination" did not require
common ownership for purposes of the eighty percent test."' Final Treasury
of the total value of shares of all classes of stock or each of the corporations is
owned . . .by one person who is an individual, estate, or trust.
Id.
27. Hearings Before the House Comm. On Ways and Means on the Subject of Tax Reform,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5050, 5396 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Treasury Department's General
Explanation].
28. Id. at 5394.
29. Id.
30. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 401(c), 83 Stat. 487 (1969) (codified
at I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1974)).
31. For an illustration of this ambiguity, see infra note 102. One commentator has sug-
gested that the language of the 80% test is open to four possible interpretations. A "literal"
interpretation requires 80% of each corporation to be owned by any 5 or fewer persons. If
the 80% test is met, using this interpretation, the 50% test will be met. A "sweeping" inter-
pretation requires that some combination of a group of five or fewer persons own at least
80% of the two or more corporations to compose a controlled group. This interpretation limits
the number of persons counted. An "intermediate" interpretation requires that the composi-
tion of the 80% ownership contains no conflicting counterpart in other groups. A narrow in-
terpretation requires each corporation to be composed of the same 5 or fewer persons. Libin
& Abramowitz, Multiple Corporations: A Surprising Interpretation of Section 1563(a)(2) in Tem-
porary Regulations, 2 TAx ADVISOR 326, 327-28 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Libin & Abramowitz].
32. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 13.16.1(a), T.D. 7101, 1971-1 C.B. 269 (1971) (adopted without
change in Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) (1972)).
33. The temporary regulation added to § 1563(a)(2) the words "singly or in combination"
as follows: "The term 'brother-sister controlled group' means two or more corporations if
the same five or fewer persons who are individuals, estates, or trusts own ... singly or in
combination, stock possessing. ... Temporary Treas. Reg. § 13.16-1(a), T.D. 7101, 1971-1
C.B. 269 (1971).
34. The regulation contained the following example:
Example (1). The outstanding stock of corporations P, Q, R, S, and T, which
have only one class of stock outstanding, is owned by the following unrelated
individuals:
1983]
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Regulation section 1.1563(a)(3)" was issued without change, despite criticism
that the Treasury Department had misinterpreted the language and history
of section 1563(a)(2).3 6
Judicial Standard of Review of Treasury Regulations
In reviewing Treasury Regulations,3" courts distinguish between "legislative"
regulations and "interpretative" regulations.38 Legislative regulations are
issued pursuant to a specific congressional delegation of authority granted
Individuals Corporations Identical
Ownership
P Q R S T
A 60% 60% 60% 60% 100% 60%
B 40% ... .........
C ... 40% ............
D ... ... 40% ......
E ... ...... 40%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 60%
Corporations P, Q, R, S, and T are members of a brother-sister controlled group.
Id. (example adopted without change in Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3)(1972)). The significance
of this example is that B, C, D. and E's stock interest are counted in the 80% ownership
test even though they do not own stock in each corporation. Without considering their stock
interest, P, Q, R, S, and T would not constitute members of a brother-sister controlled group
because A's 60% stock interest in P, Q, R, and S is insufficient to satisfy the 80% ownership test.
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) (1972).
36. See, e.g., Bonovitz, Brother-Sister Controlled Groups Under Section 1563: The 80 Per-
cent Ownership Test, 28 TAX LAW. 511 (1975); Libin & Abramowitz, supra note 31, at 328;
Weisman, Brother-Sister Controlled Corporations: On and Off The Road To The Supreme
Court With an Edsel, 56 TAXES 475 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Weisman]; Note, Disallowance
of Surtax Exemption to Brother-Sister Corporations-Stock Ownership Test Under Sections 1551
and 1563, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1000; Note, The Brother-Sister Controlled Group Under IRC
§ 1563(a)(2), 67 VA. L. REV. 751 (1981).
37. Treasury Regulations are issued by the Secretary of the Treasury Department. For a
general discussion of the Treasury's goals and promulgation procedures, see Williams, Prepara-
tion and Promulgation of Treasury Department Regulations Under Internal Revenue Code of
1954, 1956 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 733 [hereinafter cited as Williams].
For an extensive discussion of the authoritative effect of administrative rulings, see generally
2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7:8-7:16 (2d ed. 1979 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as DAvIS].
38. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 102 S. Ct. 821 (1982), stated:
The framework for analysis is refined by consideration of the source of the authority
to promulgate the regulation at issue. . . .Accordingly, "we owe [interpretative
regulations] less deference than a regulation issued under a specific grant of authority
to define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision."
Id. at 827 (quoting Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981)). See also United
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 589 F.2d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1978) (legislative
regulations enjoy a greater presumption of validity than interpretative regulations), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 917 (1979); Bates v. United States, 581 F.2d 575, 580 (6th Cir. 1978) (legislative regula-
tions are accorded greater weight than that given to interpretative regulations).
Before Vogel and Rowan, some courts treated legislative regulations and interpretative regula-
tions in a similar fashion. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
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under a particular Code section." A properly issued legislative regulation"0
carries the force of law"' against the Commissioner and the taxpayer" unless
the regulation exceeds the scope of the delegated authority, 3 contradicts the
Code, or is unreasonable."
Interpretative regulations, on the other hand, are issued pursuant to sec-
tion 7805 of the Code"5 which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury
Department to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement"'" of the tax laws unless such authority has been explicitly
delegated to another governmental department. Courts have held that inter-
39. For example, I.R.C. § 1502 authorizes the Secretary to promulgate "such regulations
as he may deem necessary" to determine the tax liability of affiliated corporations filing con-
solidated federal income tax returns. I.R.C. § 1502 (Law. Co-op. 1974).
40. Sections 553(b), (c), and (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act require that notice
of proposed rulemaking be published in the Federal Register 30 days prior to the adoption
of a legislative regulation. Id. § 553 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1980). The administrative agency
must also give interested members of the public an opportunity to comment on the proposed
regulation. Id. § 553(c). Legislative regulations failing to comply with these procedures are
invalid. See, e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 267-69 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
41. See United Telecommunications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 589 F.2d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir.
1978) (legislative regulations enjoy a greater presumption of validity than interpretative regula-
tions); Bates v. United States, 581 F.2d 575, 580 (6th Cir. 1978) (legislative regulations are
accorded even greater weight than that accorded interpretative regulations); Lykes Bros. Steam-
ship Co. v. United States, 513 F.2d 1342, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (legislative regulations are entitled
to more than the usual great weight accorded interpretative regulations). See also J. CHOMMIE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 13 (2d ed. 1973) (legislative regulations are regarded as having the
status of law); Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43
TAXES 756, 758-59 (1965) (legislative regulations are generally given the force and effect of
law) [hereinafter cited as Rogovin]; Westin, Dubious Interpretative Rules For Construing Federal
Taxing Statutes, 17 WAKE Fop-EST L. REV. 1, 7-20 (1980) (legislative regulations carry the force
of law) [hereinafter cited as Westin].
42. See Lansons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 622 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1980) (taxpayers and
tax officials are both required to abide by Treasury Regulations); Miller v. Commissioner, 333
F.2d 400, 403 (8th Cir. 1964) (Treasury Regulations are binding on both the Commissioner
and taxpayer); McCord v. Granger, 201 F.2d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1952) ("[i]t is well-settled that
Treasury Regulations .. .are as binding on the Government as they are on the taxpayer");
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States, 395 F.2d 1005, 1008 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (regulations bind both
the Government and the taxpayer).
43. The Supreme Court has stated that an administrator's power to prescribe rules and
regulations is not the power to make law, but is only the power to adopt regulations effec-
tuating the will of Congress as expressed in the statute. See Miller v. United States, 294 U.S.
435, 439-40 (1935); Lynch v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U.S. 315, 320-22 (1924). Accord General
Electric Co. v. Burton, 372 F.2d 108, 110-11 (6th Cir. 1967) (Treasury only possesses authority
to make regulations to carry out the purposes of the statute, not to amend it).
44. See Sanford v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 201, 202 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (legislative regula-
tions must be upheld unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the statute), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 841 (1969); Estate of Willett v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 760, 770 (5th Cir. 1966)
(legislative regulations must be reasonable and consistent with the revenue statute).
45. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974). See Faygo Beverages, Inc. v. United States, 640
F.2d 27, 28 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (§ 7805(a) authorizes the Secretary of Treasury to
promulgate regulations to enforce the Internal Revenue laws).
46. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974).
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pretative regulations are appropriate only where a statute is ambiguous"7 or
so general in its terms as to require interpretation." Consequently, inter-
pretative regulations may not restrict or enlarge the scope of a statute, supply
a supposed omission, create an exemption, or limit any rights under the
statute."
Although they are not given the same force of law as legislative regula-
tions, interpretative regulations issued contemporaneously with the statute
traditionally have been accorded great weight." The Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that as contemporaneous constructions of the Code, inter-
pretative regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and clearly in-
consistent with the revenue statute.' In applying this standard, courts have
47. See Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 (1936) (Treasury may not amend an un-
ambiguous statute by regulation); H. Wetter Mfg. Co. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1033, 1035
(6th Cir. 1972) (regulations are improper if the statute is unambiguous); United States v. DI.
Operating Co., 362 F.2d 305, 309 (9th Cir. 1966) ("conducted for profit" is not so clear as
to be closed to construction); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. United States, 589 F.2d 1040, 1045
(Ct. Cl. 1978) (sole purpose of an interpretative regulation is to reconcile statutory ambiguities
with reasoned interpretations).
48. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 102 S. Ct. 821, 827 (1982); National Muffler
Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1976); Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114 (1939).
49. The Supreme Court has stated that neither the courts nor "the Commissioner may rewrite
the statute simply because [they] . . . feel that the scheme it creates could be improved upon."
United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 357 (1957). See also Bates v. United States, 581
F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 1978) (Treasury may not issue regulations to supply a supposed omis-
sion or to enlarge the scope of the revenue act); Poirier & McLane Corp. v. Commissioner,
547 F.2d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (a regulation cannot add a condi-
tion or restriction not contemplated by Congress); Busse v. Commissioner, 479 F.2d 1147, 1152
(7th Cir. 1973) (Commissioner has no power to rewrite a statute so as to give Code symmetry);
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. United States, 589 F.2d 1040, 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (Treasury cannot
supply omissions or create exceptions to a statute).
50. The Supreme Court recognized this principle as early as 1827. In Edwards' Lessee v.
Darb, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827), the Court acknowledged that in "the construction of
a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who were called
upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled
to very great respect." Id. at 210. See also Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 336 (1930) (it
is well settled that the Treasury's interpretation of an ambiguous or doubtful statute will not
be disturbed except for strong reasons); Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192, 1196
(7th Cir. 1979) (interpretative regulations must be given great weight absent a showing that
they are unreasonsble or inconsistent with congressional intent), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824
(1980); Holman v. Commissioner, 564 F.2d 283, 284 (9th Cir. 1977) ("an interpretative regula-
tion, not unreasonable and not obviously inconsistent with the statute, should be given effect").
But no deference, however, is warranted where the regulations are vague, Big Mama Rag,
Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1980), or where Congress expressly agreed
with a case holding contrary to the regulation during a subsequent reenactment of the statute,
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 599, 610 (5th Cir. 1977).
51. In Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 494 (1948), the Supreme Court
stated that "[tlhis Court has many times declared that Treasury Regulations must be sustained
unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes and that they constitute
contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration of these statutes which
should not be overruled except for weighty reasons." Id. at 501 (citing Fawcus Machine Co.
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upheld Treasury Regulations despite the existence of more reasonable inter-
pretations of the statute." Such deference has been justified on two grounds.
First, under Code section 7805, Congress has delegated the task of prescrib-
ing rules and regulations necessary for the enforcement of the Code to the
Treasury Department and not the courts. 3 As contemporaneous interpreta-
tions of the Code, interpretative regulations provide the best indication of
the congressional intention at the time of a statute's enactment and the con-
cerns of the persons active in drafting the statute."' Second, an interpretative
regulation may acquire the force of law if applied consistently over a long
time period" or if Congress has knowledge of the regulation and reenacts
v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931)). Accord Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528,
533 (1978); Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50 (1969).
52. In upholding the Commissioner's "overnight rule" concerning the deductibility of meals
consumed during business travel, the Supreme Court stated:
But we do not sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration of the
tax laws. Congress has delegated to the Commissioner, not to the courts, the task
of prescribing "all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a). In this area of limitless factual variations,
"it is the province of Congress and the Commissioner, not the courts, to make
the appropriate adjustment." The rule of the judiciary in cases of this sort begins
and ends with assuring that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority
to implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable mariner.
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1967) (citations omitted). See also Ruehlmann
v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 1302, 1304 (6th Cir. 1969) (the courts are not at liberty to second
guess the Commissioner's choice of a third criterion if it is reasonable), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
950 (1970); Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d 45, 48 (7th Cir. 1969) (where there are several
valuation methods possible, any permissible one chosen by the Commissioner may not be set
aside); Kern v. Granquist, 291 F.2d 29, 32 (9th Cir. 1961) ("[however logical we may think
our interpretation to be, it was not the interpretation placed on the statute by the government
in its Regulations . . . and this is entitled to weight in our consideration of the matter").
53. See supra note 52. See also Continental Equities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 551 F.2d 74,
82 (5th Cir. 1977) (because Congress has expressly delegated rulemaking authority to the Treasury,
Treasury Regulations are valid legislative rules if within the granted power, issued pursuant
to proper procedure, and reasonable); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. United States, 589 F.2d 1040,
1043 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (courts will defer to a reasonable interpretative regulation "because it was
made by the agency Congress has entrusted with carrying out its purpose").
54. White v. Winchester Country Club, 315 U.S. 32, 41 (1942). See Williams, supra note
37, at 7,.. Williams, as head of the Legal Advisory Staff to the Secretary of Treasury, explained
that the contemporaneous doctrine is founded in fact because Treasury personnel frequently
take an active role in formulating statutes and committee reports. Id.
55. The Supreme Court, in Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938), stated that "[treasury
regulations and interpretations long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended
or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and
have the effect of law." Id. at 83. See also Faygo Beverages, Inc. v. United States, 640 F.2d
27, 29 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (stressing that the regulation was in effect since 1953 and
Congress has amended the statute a number of times without invalidating the regulation); Home
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 639 F.2d 333, 339-40 (7th Cir. 1980) (regulations in effect
since 1944 were deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect of law);
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 598 F.2d 1211, 1219 n.17 (lst Cir. 1979) (regulation in
force for 34 years was deemed to have the force of law).
But even long-standing regulations will not be upheld if inconsistent with the statute. See,
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the statute interpreted by the regulation."'
Two Supreme Court cases typify the traditional respect afforded inter-
pretative regulations. In United States v. Correll,"7 the Court sustained an
interpretative Treasury Regulation even though it noted that more reasonable
constructions of the statute existed. 8 Under section 162(a)(2)," taxpayers
"traveling . . away from home in the pursuit of trade or business" may
deduct amounts expended for meals and lodging.' The challenged regula-
tion construed the phrase "away from home" to include only those trips
requiring sleep or rest.6 ' Although the Treasury's interpretation is hardly
appropriate in determining when travel is away from home considering the
supersonic travel of today,' 2 and a more reasonable statutory construction
would measure travel away from home in distance instead of time,' 3 the
e.g., Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981) (invalidating a regulation in force
for 40 years); Schudel v. Commissioner, 563 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (invalidating
a regulation in force for almost 40 years).
56. See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 469 (1946) (a regulation surviving subse-
quent reenactments of the statute is deemed to possess implied legislative approval and have
the effect of law); Maurer v. United States, 284 F.2d 122, 124 (10th Cir. 1960) (there is a
presumption of validity of regulation which was in force when a statute was reenacted).
A few commentators, however, have criticized the reenactment doctrine and have suggested
that it be abolished. See Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 398, 399-404 (1941) (considering the infinite number of regulations on the books, it is
unlikely that the legislators are aware of each regulation when they reenact a statute); Westin,
supra note 41, at 2-4, 21 (the rule's numerous qualifications permit it to be used as a means
for achieving a result already decided upon rather than as a true basis for decision).
57. 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
58. Id. at 306 (noting that alternatives were available and improvements might be imagined).
59. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
60. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) provides, in relevant part:
(a) In general. There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including-
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other
than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while away
from home in the pursuit of trade or business.
61. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-17(b)(3)(ii), -17(b)(4), -17(c)(2) (1959). The Treasury's sleep or rest
rule is commonly known as the "overnight rule". For a general discussion of the travel ex-
pense deduction and, in particular, the overnight rule, see 4A J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 25.92 (rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
The taxpayer in Correll was a traveling salesman for a wholesale grocery company. He routinely
ate breakfast and lunch while on the road, but returned home in time for dinner. The cost
of these morning and noon meals was deducted by the taxpayer from his 1960 and 1961 in-
come tax returns as "traveling expenses" under § 162(a)(2) of the Code. The Commissioner
disallowed the deductions as personal expenses because the taxpayer's daily trips did not re-
quire sleep or rest. Correll, 389 U.S. at 300.
62. See id. at 307 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Based on this reasoning the lower court in-
validated the regulations upheld in Correll finding that the Commissioner's "sleep or rest"
rule bears "no rational relation to the business necessity of the meal expense." Correll v. United
States, 369 F.2d 87, 89-90 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
63. For example, the Correll Court noted that § 162(a)(2) can be construed to cover those
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Correll Court upheld the regulation because it implemented Congress' intent
in a reasonable manner.64 The Court emphasized that Congress delegated
the task of prescribing all necessary regulations for the enforcement of the
tax laws to the Commissioner and not the courts."' Furthermore, the Cor-
rell Court concluded that the regulation received implicit congressional ap-
proval because it was consistently applied over a substantial period of time.66
In Fulman v. United States,67 the Court again sustained an interpretative
Treasury Regulation despite arguments that the regulation was illogical and
inconsistent with the Code's purpose. In computing its taxable income, a
personal holding company" may deduct dividends paid to its shareholders.69
The contested regulation7" continued to apply the adjusted basis measure,
which was explicitly contained in the 1939 Code but inexplicably excluded
from the 1954 Code,7 in valuing a personal holding company's dividend
deduction paid in appreciated property.7" The taxpayer argued that because
the shareholders were required to report the property's fair market value
taxpayers traveling outside their home town or beyond a number of miles from their "principal
post of duty". 389 U.S. at 303 n.14.
64. 389 U.S. at 307. The dissenters argued that the regulation's overnight rule improperly
narrowed the statute by adding a time element to the statute's geographic test. Id. (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 306-07. The Court's language is reprinted at supra note 52.
66. 389 U.S. at 305-06. Although the challenged regulations were adopted in 1958, the over-
night rule has been consistently applied since 1940. See I.T. 3395, 1940-2 C.B. 64 (1940). The
Commissioner's overnight rule, however, was not contemporaneously issued with the statute
because the relevant statutory language was first enacted in 1921. Revenue Act of 1921, ch.
136, § 214(a)(1), 42 Stat. 239 (1921) (currently codified at I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1982)). See Correll, 389 U.S. at 301 n.6.
67, 434 U.S. 528 (1978).
68. High-income individuals have abused the advantages of the lower corporate tax rates
by forming corporations solely to avoid taxes on passive income, To prevent the accumulation
of passive income at the corporate level, I.R.C. § 541 imposes a penalty tax on a personal
holding company's undistributed personal holding company income. I.R.C. § 541 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1982). The personal holding tax rate is 70% for tax years beginning before January
1, 1982 and 50% for future tax years. Id.
A corporation is considered a personal holding company if at least 60% of its adjusted gross
income is personal holding income and more than 50% of its stock is owned by five or fewer
persons. I.R.C. § 542(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1982). Personal holding income is income
from passive investment property such as dividends, rents, or royalties. Id. § 543.
For a general discussion of the personal holding company penalty tax and its history, see
7 MERTENS, supra note 61, §§ 40.01-40.68; Libin, Personal Holding Companies and the Revenue
Act of 1964, 63 MICH. L. REV. 421, 421-29 (1965).
69. I.R.C. § 561(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974).
70. See Treas. Reg. § 1.562-1(a)(1974).
71. For a discussion of this statutory scheme, see Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528,
536-38 (1978).
72. Treasury Regulation § 1.562-1(a) provides that "[i]f a dividend is paid in property (other
than money) the amount of the dividends paid deduction with respect to such property shall
be the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the distributing corporation at the time
of the distribution .. " Treas. Reg. § 1.562-1(a)(1974).
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as dividend income," the personal holding company should correspondingly
receive a deduction equal to the property's fair market value.7" The Court
recognized the logical force of the taxpayer's view75 but stressed that the
issue was not how the statutory ambiguity might be resolved in the first
instance, but whether there was any reasonable basis for the regulation.76
The Fulman Court upheld the regulation, reasoning that the House and Senate
Reports did not compel the conclusion that Congress intended to abandon
the adjusted basis valuation rule."
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has expressed this traditional
deference with less enthusiasm and seemingly has applied a higher standard
of review. Although the Court has stated that Treasury Regulations will be
sustained if they implement Congress' intent in some reasonable manner, 8
the Court appears to be attaching a greater significance to the distinction
between legislative regulations and interpretative regulations." Legislative
regulations enjoy a presumption of validity and will be sustained unless clearly
inconsistent with the revenue statute. 0 Arguably, interpretative regulations
no longer merit such deference.
National Muffler Dealers Associations v. United States' and Rowan Com-
panies v. United States, 2 indicate that interpretative regulations will be sub-
jected to a higher standard of review and, thus, given less deference than
previously afforded. In reviewing the validity of an interpretative regulation,
the Court in National Muffler declared that to be reasonable, a regulation
must harmonize with the statute's language, history, and purpose. 3 Further-
73. Property received by noncorporate shareholders as dividends are taxable to the
shareholders at the property's fair market value. I.R.C. § 301(b)(I)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1974).
74. Fulman, 434 U.S. at 534.
75. See id. at 534 (citing I.R.C. § 301(b)(l)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1974)).
76. Id. at 536.
77. Id. at 538. The Court's deference in Fulman is emphasized by the dissent's statement
that "[t]he Court simply resolves the statutory jumble in favor of the Treasury Regulation."
Id. at 540 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The dissent in Fulman asserted that the regulation was contrary to logic and the statutory
purpose. The personal holding company tax was created solely to encourage personal holding
companies to distribute all of their income to the shareholders. Id. See supra note 68. Requir-
ing shareholders to include the appreciated property's fair market value as dividend income
while limiting the personal holding company's dividend deduction to a lesser value, the proper-
ty's adjusted basis, will hinder rather than promote the statutory purpose. 434 U.S. at 540
(Powell, J., dissenting).
78. See, e.g., Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 252-53 (1981); Commissioner
v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United
States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-77 (1979).
79. See Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981) (interpretative regulations
are afforded "less deference than a regulation issued under a specific grant of authority to
define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision").
80. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
81. 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
82. 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
83. 440 U.S. at 477.
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more, the Court articulated several factors that correlate the degree of validity
a regulation will be accorded. One factor, whether the interpretative regula-
tion is a contemporaneous statutory construction by those presumed to have
been aware of the congressional intent, may be given particular force. "4 Other
factors include the length of time the regulation has been in effect, the reliance
placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner's interpretation, and the
degree of scrutiny Congress devoted to the regulation during subsequent
reenactments of the statute. 5
Applying the National Muffler test, the Rowan Court invalidated inter-
pretative regulations that had been in force for forty years and that had
survived Congress' recodification of the 1939 Code. The challenged
regulations86 construed the term "wages" contained in the Federal Unemploy-
ment Tax Act87 (FUTA) and the Federal Insurance Contribution Act88 (FICA)
to include the value of meals and lodging the taxpayer provided to its
employees, 9 even though these benefits were excluded from the employees'
gross income9 ° and from the employee income tax withholding provision of
84. Id.
85. Id. These factors are an aberration from past law in several important respects. Prior
to National Muffler, contemporaneity automatically invoked great judicial deference. See supra
notes 50-54 and accompanying text. After National Muffler, however, a contemporaneous statute
may have particular force. Furthermore, in determining whether an interpretative regulation
had the force and effect of law, the courts previously considered the length of time the regula-
tion had been in effect and the degree of scrutiny Congress had devoted to the regulation
during subsequent reenactments of the statute. Under this standard, regulations would acquire
the force of law if applied consistently over a long time period or if Congress reenacted a
statute with knowledge of how the regulation construed the statute. See supra notes 55-56 and
accompanying text. In articulating these two factors under the rubric of "[oither relevant con-
siderations", the National Muffler Court suggests a diminished role for these factors. 440 U.S.
at 477. The Court's subsequent decision in Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981),
further supports this conclusion. In Rowan the Court invalidated interpretative Treasury Regula-
tions that had been in force for forty years and which had survived Congress' recodification
of the 1939 Code. For a discussion of the Court's analysis in Rowan, see infra notes 86-95
and accompanying text.
86. See Treas. Reg. § § 31.3306(b)-l(e)-(f) (1961) (construing wages as defined in the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act); Treas. Reg. § § 31.3121(a)-l(e)-(f) (1960) (construing wages as de-
fined in the Federal Insurance Contribution Act).
87. I.R.C. § 3306(b) (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as FUTA]. FUTA
imposes a tax on certain employers based on the wages paid to their employees. Id. § 3301.
88. Id. § 3121(a) [hereinafter cited as FICA]. FICA imposes a tax upon employers and
employees based on employee wages. Id. §§ 3111, 3101(a). These taxes fund the various Social
Security programs.
89. The taxpayer, Rowan Companies, Inc., owned and operated offshore oil and gas rigs.
Because of the high cost involved in transporting its employees to and from the rigs for each
work shift, Rowan Companies provided its employees with meals and lodging. 452 U.S. at
248-49. In computing its employee wages for purposes of FICA and FUTA, Rowan Com-
panies did not include the value of meals and lodging provided to its employees. Relying on
the contested Treasury Regulations, the Commissioner disagreed and assessed the additional
taxes. Id. at 249-50.
90. I.R.C. § 119 excludes from an employee's gross income the value of meals or lodging
furnished by his or her employer for the employer's convenience if:
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section 3402(a). 9' After noting that Congress has consistently defined "wages"
under FICA, FUTA, and section 3402 in substantially the same language, 92
the Court concluded that Congress intended "wages" to have the same mean-
ing under each provision.93 The legislative history which revealed a congres-
sional concern for simplicity and for administrative convenience further sup-
ported this conclusion.9 4 The Rowan Court refused to accord these longstan-
ding regulations the force of law because they were inconsistent with the
1936 contemporaneous regulations and with a 1938 Treasury ruling which
inexplicably remained on the books until 1962. 91
THE VOGEL DECISION
Facts and Procedural History
Vogel Fertilizer Company is an Iowa corporation engaged in the business
of retailing farm fertilizer products.96 From 1973 through 1975, Arthur Vogel
held 77.49% of the corporation's common stock and Richard Crain owned
the remaining 22.51 %.97 Vogel Popcorn Company, another Iowa corpora-
tion, sold popcorn in the wholesale and retail markets. 98 During the same
period, Arthur Vogel held a 87.5% interest in this corporation and the Alex
(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business premises of the
employer; or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept such lodging on the
business premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.
I.R.C. § 119 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
91. Id. § 3402(a). This section requires employers to withhold a specified amount of in-
come tax from its employees' "wages". Treasury Regulation § 31.3401(a)-l(b)(9)-(10) (1982),
construed "wages" contained in Code § 3402(a) to exclude all items excluded from an employee's
gross income.
92. 452 U.S. at 262-63. FICA and FUTA were enacted in 1935. Social Security Act of
1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 636, 639. Code § 3402(a) was enacted in 1943. Revenue Act of
1942, ch. 619, § 172, 56 Stat. 798, 884. Congress has defined the term "wages" in all three
provisions with substantially the same language, specifically, all remuneration for employment,
including the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium other than cash. See I.R.C.
§§ 312(a) (FICA), 3306(b) (FUTA), 3402(a) (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1982).
93. 452 U.S. at 263.
94. Id. at 255. Although the Court's analysis supports one possible interpretation, it does
not demonstrate that the Treasury's interpretation is incorrect. Quite possibly, Congress could
have intended to subject employers to FICA and FUTA taxes on the value of meals and lodg-
ing furnished to its employees even though these benefits were excluded from the employee's
gross income.
95. Id. at 261-62. See also supra note 85 (noting that National Muffler indicates that long
continued regulations will no longer automatically be accorded the force of law, but that the
length of time the regulation has been in effect will be only one of various factors to consider).
96. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 102 S. Ct. 821, 825 (1982).
97. Id. Vogel Fertilizer Company had only one class of common stock issued and outstan-
ding. Of the total 146,575 outstanding shares, Arthur Vogel owned 113,575 shares (77.49%)
and Richard Crain held the remaining 33,000 shares (22.51 %). Brief for Petitioner at 2, United
States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 102 S. Ct. 821 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Brief].
98. 102 S. Ct. at 825.
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Vogel Family Trust owned the remaining 12.5%."99 Richard Crain did not
own any stock in Vogel Popcorn.1"'
Relying on Treasury Regulation section 1.1563-(1)(a)(3), "I Vogel Fertilizer
Company considered itself a member of a brother-sister controlled group
with Vogel Popcorn' 2 and did not claim a full surtax exemption for the
tax years 1973 through 1975.103 Under Treasury Regulation section
1.1563-(l)(a)(3), Richard Crain's 22.51 % stock interest; in Vogel Fertilizer was
counted for purposes of the eighty percent requirement of section 1563(a)(2)
even though Richard Crain did not own any stock in Vogel Popcorn, the
other alleged member of the brother-sister controlled group.'0 " Without con-
99. Id. Vogel Popcorn Company had issued and outstanding 440,062 shares of common
stock, all of which was owned by Arthur Vogel, and 62,866 shares of voting preferred stock,
all of which was held by the Alex Vogel Family Trust. As a result, Arthur Vogel owned 87.5%
of the total voting stock of Vogel Popcorn Company and the Alex Vogel Trust owned the
remaining 12.5%. Furthermore, Arthur Vogel held between 90.66% and 93.42% of the total
stock value of Vogel Popcorn. Brief for Respondant at 2, United States v. Vogel Fertilizer
Co., 102 S. Ct. 821 (1982).
100. 102 S. Ct. at 825. Richard Crain was unrelated to Arthur Vogel and, thus, did not
own any stock indirectly under the attribution rules of I.R.C. § 1563(e). See generally supra
note 7 (citing authorities that discuss the application of the attribution rules of § 1563(e)).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) (1972). For the relevant text of this regulation, see supra
note 33.
102. The application of I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) to the Vogel facts is illustrated by the following
table.





SHAREHOLDERS Fertilizer Co. Popcorn Co.
Arthur Vogel 77.49% 87.5% 77.49%
Richard Crain 22.51%
TOTAL 77.49 or 100% 87.5% 77.49%
Vogel Fertilizer Co. and Vogel Popcorn Co. are members of a brother-sister controlled group
only if Richard Crain's 22.51% stock interest in Vogel Fertilizer is considered for purposes
of the 80% ownership test. Treasury Regulation § 1.1563(a)(3) would include Crain's stock
interest even though he does not own stock in Vogel Popcorn. Thus, under the regulations's
construction of I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2), Vogel Fertilizer and Vogel Popcorn would be considered
members of a brother-sister controlled group because together Arthur Vogel and Richard Crain
own at least 80% of each corporation (actually 100% of Vogel Fertilizer and 87.5% of Vogel
Popcorn) and have more than a 50% identical stock interest in each corporation (77.49% iden-
tical stock interest). If the 80% test is interpreted as requiring common ownership, however,
Richard Crain's stock interest would not be counted and the 80% test would not be satisfied
with respect to Vogel Fertilizer.
103. For its taxable years ending November 30, 1973 and 1974, Vogel Fertilizer Co. elected
under I.R.C. § 1562 to claim a full surtax exemption and to pay the six percent surtax penalty
imposed by I.R.C. § 1562(b). For the tax year ending November 30, 1975, Vogel Fertilizer
elected tp allocate the single surtax exemption allowed to members of a brother-sister con-
trolled group entirely to Vogel Popcorn Company. 102 S. Ct. at 825 n.5. See supra note 23
and accompanying text (discussing the surtax limitation and I.R.C. § 1562).
104. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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sidering Richard Crain's stock interest, Vogel Fertilizer and Vogel Popcorn
would not have constituted a brother-sister controlled group because five
or fewer persons did not own eighty percent of each corporation."'
Subsequently, the United States Tax Court in Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc.
v. Commissioner,'" invalidated Treasury Regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3)
concluding it was an unreasonable statutory construction. Contrary to the
regulation, the Tax Court in Fairfax held that the eighty percent test of Code
section 1563(a)(2) contains a common ownership requirement.'"7 Relying on
Fairfax, Vogel Fertilizer filed timely tax refund claims for the years 1973
through 1975, claiming that it was entitled to a full surtax exemption because
it was not a member of a brother-sister controlled group.' Vogel Fertilizer
contended that Richard Crain's interest should not have been included for
purposes of the eighty percent test because he did not own stock in Vogel
Popcorn.'"9 The Internal Revenue Service refused to follow Fairfax and relied
on Treasury Regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3) to reject the claims. ' "
Vogel Fertilizer Company, however, successfully brought suit for refund
in the United States Court of Claims."' Although acknowledging that the
regulation was not a totally unreasonable construction of the statutory
language of section 1563(a)(2), the Court of Claims held the regulation in-
valid because it was inconsistent with the statute's legislative history and
purpose.'2 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari'' 3 to resolve
the existing conflict among the lower federal courts. '"
Holding and Analysis
The sole issue before the Vogel Court concerned the validity of Treasury
Regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3).' ' The Court found that despite the long
105. See supra note 102.
106. 65 T.C. 798 (1976)(5-4 decision), rev'd per curiam, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 904 (1977).
107. 65 T.C. at 803. Based on the language and history of § 1563(a)(2), the Tax Court con-
cluded that Code § 1563(a)(2) was intended to apply only where each person in the five or
fewer group owned stock in each corporation. Id. The dissent, however, stressing that contem-
poraneous regulations are entitled to great weight, believed the regulation to be entirely consis-
tent with the statute and its legislative history. Id. at 807-08 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
108. 102 S. Ct. at 825.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Vogel Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 497 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
112. Id. at 503. The dissent criticized the majority's analysis contending that the issue was
not whether the Treasury's construction was as reasonable as the taxpayer's view, but whether
the taxpayer "had carried its heavy burden of showing the regulation to be unreasonable and
plainly inconsistent with the statute." id. at 513 n.1, 514 (Smith, J., dissenting).
113. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
114. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
115. 102 S. Ct. at 827. The Court recognized that Arthur Vogel's stock interest' in each
corporation satisfied the 50% identical stock ownership requirement but was insufficient to
satisfy the 80% test without also considering Richard Crain's 22.51% stock interest in Vogel
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standing policy of deferring to regulations which implement Congress' in-
tent in some reasonable manner, less than traditional deference was owed
to the regulation in question." '6 The Court emphasized that the regulation
was interpretative rather than legislative"' and that it construed an ambiguous
statutory definition rather than a broad statutory term." 8 Applying the Na-
tional Muffler test, the Court found the regulation's phrase "singly or in
combination" invalid because it was inconsistent with the language, history,
and purpose of Code section 1563(a)(2)."'1 The Court concluded that Con-
gress intended for the statute to apply only where each person owned stock
in each corporation of the alleged brother-sister controlled group.' 20
The Court acknowledged that the statutory language is not completely
unambiguous, but nevertheless concluded that it is in closer harmony with
the taxpayer's view. " ' Noting that the phrase "five or fewer" is the con-
junctive subject of the eighty percent and fifty percent requirements, the
Court reasoned that precisely the same five or fewer shareholders must satisfy
both tests.'2 2 Because the fifty percent test considers only those shareholders
who own stock in each corporation,' 3 the Court determined that the eighty
percent test also requires common ownership. "
Fertilizer. Noting that the phrase "singly or in combination" in Treasury Regulation § 1.1563(a)(3)
did not explicitly require common ownership, the Court concluded that its validity was the
sole issue. Id. at 826-27.
116. 102 S. Ct. at 827. The Court further stated that the "general principle of deference,
while fundamental, only sets 'the framework for judicial analysis, it does not displace it.'
Id. (quoting United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973)).
117. 102 S. Ct. at 827. See also supra note 38.
118. The Court stated that:
Treas. Reg. § 1.1563(a)(3) purports to do no more than add a clarifying gloss on
a term-"brother-sister controlled group"-that has already been defined with con-
siderable specificity by Congress. The Commissioner's authority is consequently more
circumscribed than would be the case if Congress had used a term "so general
• ' * as to render an interpretive regulation appropriate."
102 S. Ct. at 827 (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,
476 (1979)).
119. 102 S. Ct. at 827-28. The Court acknowledged that a regulation must harmonize with
the statute's language, history, and purpose to be valid. Id. (citing National Muffler Dealers
Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)).
120. 102 S. Ct. at 827.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Court further noted that the phrase "brother-sister controlled group" connotes
a close horizontal relationship between two or more corporations, suggesting that the same
indivisible group of five or fewer must satisfy both the 80% and 50% tests. Id.
123. The 50% test only considers a person's identical stock ownership in each corporation.
Thus, if a person does not own stock in one or more of the corporations, that individual
will have a zero identical stock ownership interest and consequently will not be considered
for purposes of the 50% requirement. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
124. 102 S. Ct. at 827. The Court also noted that the phrase "each such person.' in I.R.C.
§ 1563(a)(2)(B) (tile 50% test) further supports this conclusion. This phrase refers back to the
five or fewer ownership group and thus suggests that each shareholder in the ownership group
must be considered for both the 80% and 50% requirements. Id. at 827 n.8 (citing Fairfax
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The Court further held that the legislative history and purpose of section
1563(a)(2) resolves any ambiguity in the statutory language and clearly
demonstrates that Treasury Regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3) is an
unreasonable statutory interpretation." 5 The Court deduced that the
Treasury's construction of the eighty percent test failed to accomplish the
congressional purpose of identifying and regulating the interrelationship be-
tween two or more corporations. Noting that section 1563(a)(2) was enacted
to curb the abuse of multiple incorporation by large organizations,' 26 the
majority reasoned that the intended targets of section 1563(a)(2) were groups
of interrelated corporations characterized by common control and
ownership.'" Based on the statute's legislative history, the Court further con-
cluded that the eighty percent test was intended to serve as the primary test
for defining the interrelationship between the corporations.' 8 The Court
stressed the fact that the original definition of a brother-sister controlled
group in 1964 contained only the eighty percent requirement and implicitly
required common ownership.' 9 In addition, the Treasury Department's
General Explanation of the 1969 amendment to section 1563(a)(2)
demonstrated that the eighty percent test was to remain the primary indicia
of interrelationship.'3 ° The Treasury Department explained that the 1969
amendment expanded the ownership group from one to "five or fewer" per-
sons simply to prevent easy avoidance of the eighty percent test, while the
fifty percent test was created merely to insure that this expanded definition
applies only to corporations operating as one economic entity.' 3'
Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798, 803 (1976), rev'd per curiam, 548 F.2d 501
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977)).
125. 102 S. Ct. at 828. The Court emphasized that a regulation which is fundamentally at
odds with the manifest congressional design will not be sustained although it is not "techni-
cally inconsistent" with the statutory language. Id. (citing United States v. Cartwright, 411
U.S. 546, 557 (1973)).
126. 102 S. Ct. at 828. For a discussion of the multiple incorporation abuse and Congress'
attempt to curb it through Code §§ 1561-1563, see supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
127. 102 S. Ct. at 828.
128. Id. The Court noted that the 50% requirement also measures, to a lesser degree, the
overlap between two or more corporations, but stressed that Congress intended the 80% re-
quirement to be the primary test for defining the interrelationship between the corporations. Id.
129. Id. at 829. For the full text of the original 1964 definition of a brother-sister controlled
group, see supra note 26.
130. 102 S. Ct. at 829-30.
131. In explaining the respective roles of the expanded 80% test and the new 50% require-
ment, the Treasury Department stated:
This provision expands present law by considering the combined stock ownership
of five individuals, rather than one individual, in applying the 80 percent test
... .However, in order to insure that this expanded definition of brother-sister
controlled group applies only to those cases where the five or fewer individuals
hold their 80 percent in a way which allows them to operate the corporations as
one economic entity, the proposal would add an additional rule that the ownership
of five or fewer individuals must constitute more than 50 percent of the stock of
each corporation considering, in this test of ownership, stock of a particular per-
son only to the extent that it is owned identically with respect to each corporation.
Treasury Department's General Explanation, supra note 27, at 5394.
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The majority concluded that the contested regulation was contrary to the
congressional purpose of identifying the interrelationship between two or more
corporations.' 32 Without a common ownership requirement, the eighty per-
cent test would determine only whether the corporations are closely held'33
and, thus, would fail to identify the interrelationship between the
corporations. I ,
The Court also noted that the Treasury Department's General Explana-
tion explicitly corroborates the taxpayer's view. In setting forth the Technical
Explanation for the 1969 amendment, the Treasury Department stated that
the "same five or fewer persons [must] own at least 80% of the voting stock
or value of shares of each corporation and . . . these five or fewer individuals
must satisfy the 50% requirement in Part(B)."'13 According to the Court,
this statement unequivocally mandates that the eighty percent test requires
common ownership. 3
6
Although it is Congress' intent which ultimately controls,' 37 the Court at-
tached great weight to the Treasury Department's General Explanation
because the Treasury drafted the 1969 proposal and directly expressed its
position to Congress in committee hearings.' This attachment certainly seems
appropriate because the legislative history of section 1563(a)(2) confirms that
Congress adopted not only the Treasury's proposal but also its position. 39
CRITIQUE
Recent Supreme Court cases, applying greater judicial scrutiny, have
132. 102 S. Ct. at 830.
133. Id. The Commissioner described the respective roles of the 80% and 50% requirements
as follows:
[T]he 80% test is designed to assure that within the group of five persons or fewer
the overall control of or financial interest in each of the corporations will beyond
question be substantially more than 50% (i.e., 80%), whereas the 50% test is in-
tended to assure that there will be a minimum commonality or community of in-
terest between members of the five or fewer persons in control; otherwise there
might be no tie between persons controlling one corporation and those controlling
another.
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 97, at 77 (quoting Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d
336, 340 (2d Cir. 1980)).
134. 102 S. Ct. at 830.
135. Treasury Department's General Explanation, supra note 27, at 5168 (emphasis added
by the Court except "five" was emphasized in the original).
136. 102 S. Ct. at 829 (citing the Treasury Department's General Explanation, supra note
27, at 5168).
137. 102 S. Ct. at 830.
138. Id. at 830-31. The Court reiterated the rule that "great weight" is attached to "agency
representations to Congress when the administrators 'participated in drafting and directly made
known their views to Congress in committee hearings.' " Id. (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396
U.S. 168, 192 (1969)).
139. 102 S. Ct. at 831. The Court summarily dismissed three other arguments. First, the
Commissioner contended that Congress approved of the Treasury's construction of the 80%
test when it enacted the 1969 amendment to § 1563(a)(2). Id. The expanded definition of a
brother-sister controlled group was copied verbatim from § 1551's definition of "control" and
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deviated from the traditional standard of review of Treasury Regulations.' 40
The Vogel decision is commendable because it continues this trend and in-
directly requires interpretative regulations to satisfy a higher threshold stan-
dard of reasonableness."" Indeed, Treasury Regulations should be subject
to a higher standard of review" 2 because they are issued by a biased ad-
ministrative agency. ' 3 Regulations are an intergral source of a taxpayer's
understanding of the tax law' 4 and, consequently, have a significant impact
the regulations thereunder contained an example indicating that no common ownership was
required for purposes of the 80% test. See supra note 18 (discussing § 1551). The Court re-
jected this argument because § 1551 only applies to transferors and there is no method for
determining which brother-sister corporation is to be regarded as the transferor and which as
the transferee. 102 S. Ct. at 831 n.13.
Second, the Commissioner asserted that Congress implicitly approved of the regulation when
it expressly incorporated § 1563(a)(2) in the Employee Retirement Act of 1974. I.R.C. § 414
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982). The Court, however, declared that it is the intent of the Congress
that amended § 1563(a)(2), not of a subsequent Congress, that is controlling. 102 S. Ct. at 832.
Finally, the Court refused to uphold the regulation merely because a common ownership
requirement would lead to the nonsensical result that ownership of only one share could be
determinative. The Court emphasized that an objective test inherently has sharp dividing lines.
Furthermore, ownership of one share insures that each of the five or fewer shareholders knows
which corporations are potential members of a brother-sister controlled group. 102 S. Ct. at 832.
140. See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
142. There are conflicting policy considerations regarding the proper standard of judicial
review and the degree of validity a treasury regulation should be accorded. Ostensibly, courts
should be able to utilize the benefit of hindsight and experience to develop sounder construc-
tions of a statute. This interest, however, must be weighed against the need for certainty and
predictability in our tax laws. Compare Westin, supra note 41, at 22 (presumption of validity
should not be a substitute for logic and recently promulgated regulations should be closely
scrutinized and held to high standards of good sense) with Rogovin, supra note 41, at 756
("[olur complex tax law, with its 'invisible boomerangs,' makes the need for certainty a primary
requisite of good administration").
143. One author notes that "[in determining the effect of Treasury Regulations it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the Treasury's interest is in revenue and naturally its Regulations
are favorable to its maintenance rather than unbiased." I MERTENS, supra note 61, § 3.21,
at 38-39 (rev. ed. 1981).
Moreover, there appears to be a growing distrust of administrative agencies in general. Not
long before his elevation to the highest bench, Chief Justice Burger referred to the theory that
an agency such as the FCC effectively represents the public interest as:
one of those assumptions we collectively try to work with so long as they are
reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no
longer a valid assumption which stands up under the realities of actual experience,
neither we nor the Commission can continue to rely on it.
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003-04 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). See also Schwartz, Administrative Law and the Burger Court, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
325, 399 (1980) (noting that the Supreme Court's increased judicial activism in administrative
law cases is a direct response to the growing distrust of administrative agencies); Schwartz,
Califano v. Sanders and Administrative Procedure Act Interpretation: Has the Supreme Court's
"Hospitable" Attitude Given Way to a More Restrictive Approach?, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1323,
1339 (1977) (stating that the "[g]rowing distrust of agencies and calls for effective controls
over administrative abuses emanate from all sides").
144. Considering the complexity of the present Federal Income Tax Code and its numerous
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on the determination of tax liability.' 5 Furthermore, greater judicial scrutiny
may encourage the Treasury Department to promulgate reasonable regula-
tions and inspire Congress to enact unambiguous statutes.
In reaching its decision, however, the Vogel Court misconstrued the
language, history, and purpose of section 1563(a)(2), perhaps to avoid an
explicit statment that a higher standard of review was being imposed. The
majority erroneously held that the regulation was wholly incompatible with
the statute's language, history, and purpose. Although the Court's analysis
supports one possible statutory interpretation, it does not establish that the
Treasury's interpretation of section 1563(a)(2) is incorrect.'4 6 To the con-
trary, the language, history, and purpose of section 1563(a)(2) support the
regulation as it previously was applied.
The plain language of section 1563(a)(2) does not require that each of
the five or fewer shareholders must own stock in each corporation before
being considered for purposes of the eighty percent test. Section 1563(a)(2)(A),
which contains the eighty percent test, does not explicitly require common
ambiguities, the regulations' general explanation and examples provide an essential source of
information to the taxpayer. The complexity of the Code and the significance of the regulation
system was articulated eloquently by Learned Hand:
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely
dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference,
exception upon exception-couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize
hold of-leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but
successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within
my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time.
Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947). See Rogovin, supra note 41, at
757 (Rogovin, as Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, declared that "[plroper tax
administration requires that the Service provide reliable and timely information to aid taxpayers
in interpreting this complex statute"). See also Westin, supra note 41, at 21 (criticizing the
"Code [as] simply too complex, its ambiguities are too numerous, and the legislative direction
is too faint").
145. For example, many corporations similar to those in Vogel, relying on Treasury Regula-
tion § 1.1563(a)(3), characterized themselves as members of a brother-sister controlled group
and, thus, did not claim a full surtax exemption or accumulated earnings credit. Consequently,
many corporate taxpayers filed refund claims after the United States Tax Court invalidated
the regulation in Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798 (1976), rev'd per
curiam, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977). At the time of the Vogel decision, an estimated 223
cases were pending in the lower courts involving approximately $3.5 million in refund claims.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Claims at 6, United States
v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 102 S. Ct. 821 (1982). Unfortunately, however, the taxpayers are only
able to recover their erroneous tax payments for the previous three years. See infra note 194.
146. Under traditional analysis, contemporaneous regulations are valid despite sounder con-
structions of the statute, unless they are unreasonable and clearly inconsistent with the statute.
See supra notes 50-77 and accompanying text. Thus to invalidate the challenged regulation
the Court must demonstrate that it is not a possible or reasonable statutory interpretation and
not merely that the taxpayer's view is a better construction. Id.
The dissent in Vogel conceded that the majority's analysis supports one possible conclusion
but argued that it "totally failed" to establish that the Commissioner's interpretation is incor-
rect. Because the regulation is not inconsistent with the statute, the dissent would defer to
the Treasury's judgment. 102 S. Ct. at 832, 834 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ownership." 7 In contrast, section (a)(2)(B) clearly imposes a common owner-
ship requirement for the fifty percent test. This latter section specifically
states: "taking into account the stock ownership of each such person only
to the extent such stock ownership is identical with respect to each such
corporation."" 8 The Vogel Court concluded, however, that because the con-
trolling group of shareholders is defined as "five or fewer" for both the
eighty percent and fifty percent tests, precisely the same shareholders must
satisfy both tests. Thus, the Court reasoned that because the fifty percent
test requires common ownership, the eighty percent test also must require
such ownership.' 9 Nevertheless, a plain reading of the statute would not
apply the common ownership requirement explicitly contained in section
1563(a)(2)(B) to the eighty percent test contained in section 1563(a)(2)(A).11°
At most, the language of section 1563(a)(2) only requires that the total
number of shareholders considered for both the eighty percent and fifty per-
cent tests cannot exceed five."' Absent some clear illumination from the
legislative history, it is reasonable to conclude that if Congress intended to
impose a common ownership requirement on the eighty percent test, it would
have explicitly provided so. '52
Furthermore, the legislative history and purpose of section 1563(a)(2) are
not as evident as the Vogel Court asserts.' 53 Ironically, the Court relied on
the Treasury Department's Technical Explanation for support. In explaining
its 1969 proposal, the Treasury Department stated that "the same five or
fewer persons [must] own at least 80% . . .of each corporation and . .
these five or fewer persons must also satisfy the 50% requirement in part
(B)."I' 4 The Court concluded that this statement explicitly corroborates that
only those shareholders considered for the fifty percent test can be counted
147. For the full text of § 1563(a)(2), see supra note 5.
148. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1974).
149. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
150. In upholding Treasury Regulation § 1.1563(a)(3) as a reasonable statutory construction,
the Eighth Circuit in Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977), concluded:
Thus it is apparent that Congress was aware of the language necessary to require
that each person whose holdings are considered in applying the 80% test must own
stock in each of the controlled corporations. We find nothing in the plain words
of the statute which warrants applying such standard with respect to the §
1563(a)(2)(A) test.
Id. at 535. Accord Vogel, 102 S. Ct. 821, 833 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Fairfax Auto
Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798, 811-12 (Simpson, J., dissenting), rev'd per curiam,
548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977).
151. See Vogel, 102 S. Ct. 821, 833 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152. See Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1980); Hunt, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1977). See also supra note 150.
153. Noting the legislative history's lack of any explicit statement on the common ownership
issue, the Vogel dissenters found the Court's analysis speculative and its certainty "somewhat
surprising". 102 S. Ct. at 833 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154. Treasury Department's General Explanation, supra note 27, at 5168 (emphasis added
by the Court except "five" was emphasized in the original).
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for the eighty percent test.'" Again, however, this language suggests only
that the total number of shareholders considered for both tests cannot ex-
ceed five.' 6 In direct opposition to the Vogel Court's holding, the Treasury's
interpretation of section 1563(a)(2) is supported by a portion of the Treasury
Department's Technical Explanation which states that the eighty percent test
"is satisfied if the group of five or fewer persons as a whole owns at least
80% of the voting stock or value of shares of each corporation, regardless
of the size of the individual holdings of each person."'57 The Treasury
Department proposed the 1969 amendment to section 1563(a)(2), which was
adopted verbatim by Congress, and wrote the General Explanation.'58 It seems
likely therefore, that the Treasury Department knew its own intent when
it issued Treasury Regulation 1.1563-1(a)(3).
The Vogel Court further stated that the challenged regulation undermined
the purpose of the eighty percent test. The majority concluded that without
a common ownership requirement, the eighty percent test simply measures
whether the corporations are closely held and, thus, thwarts the congres-
sional purpose of identifying the interrelationship between two or more
corporations.' The Court's analysis is based on the premise that Congress
intended for the eighty percent test, rather than the fifty percent test, to
be the primary mechanism for defining the interrelationship between the
corporations."6" The legislative history, however, does support this conclusion.
The legislative history never explicitly addressed this issue.'"' Instead, the
Vogel Court based its conclusion on the fact that the original definition of
a brother-sister controlled group contained only an eighty percent test and
the 1969 amendment simply expanded this definition to prevent circumven-
tion of the statute.' 2 This fact, standing alone, does not indicate that Con-
gress intended for the eighty percent test to remain as the primary indicia
155. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
156. See Vogel, 102 S. Ct. 821, 834 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Vogel dissent believed
that the legislative history was ambiguous at most. The dissenters stressed the fact that the Treasury
Department's General Explanation never specifically addressed the 80076 common ownership
issue. Furthermore, it emphasized that various lower court decisions have drawn conflicting
conclusions from precisely the same portions of the Treasury Department's General Explana-
tion. Id. at 834 & n.3.
157. Treasury Department's General Explanation, supra note 27, at 5169 (emphasis added).
In response, the Vogel majority asserted that this language further supports the taxpayer's view
"since it appears to assume that each person has holdings in each corporation." 102 S. Ct.
at 830 n.11. The majority emphasized that in each of three examples following the Treasury
Department's statement all the fictitious shareholders owned stock in each corporation. Id.
at 830 n.ll.
158. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
160. Id.
161. See Vogel, 102 S. Ct. 821, 833-34 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 829-30. For a discussion of the Vogel Court's analysis on this point, see supra
notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
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of interrelationship. '63 To the contrary, Congress' purpose of preventing easy
avoidance of the brother-sister controlled group definition is best served if
the eighty percent test is construed without a common ownership require-
ment. As the facts in Vogel demonstrate, the Court's decision will permit
close corporations, controlled by the same five or fewer persons, to circum-
vent the brother-sister controlled group restrictions. 64 More specifically, Vogel
Fertilizer Company and Vogel Popcorn Company are not considered members
of a brother-sister controlled group even though Arthur Vogel has complete
control of both corporations.' 65
Another criticism of Vogel is that the decision seriously diminishes the
significance of the fifty percent identical ownership requirement. The fifty
percent test was enacted to assure that the corporations were operating as
one economic unit.' 66 As the Vogel Court admits, the fifty percent identical
ownership requirement measures the interrelationship between the
corporations.67 Thus, requiring the eighty percent test to serve as the primary
requirement for defining the interrelationship between corporations would
render the fifty percent test superfluous.' 68
A final flaw in the Vogel analysis is the Court's misapplication of the
test articulated in National Muffler. 9'6  The National Muffler Court stated
that an interpretative regulation may have particular force if it is a contem-
poraneous statutory construction by those presumably aware of the congres-
sional intent. 7 ' Although the drafters of the 1969 statutory amendment con-
temporaneously promulgated the contested regulation in Vogel,' 7' the Court
163. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun noted that the legislative history never stated that the
80% test was to remain the primary requirement for defining the interrelationship between
the corporations. Moreover, the dissent asserted that the legislative materials are not inconsis-
tent with the Commissioner's view that the newly devised 50% test was to be the primary
indicium for assessing the interrelation. 102 S. Ct. at 833 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164. See infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 99-102. Under the Vogel Court's analysis, Vogel Fertilizer and Vogel
Popcorn would be members of a brother-sister controlled group if Richard Crain owned one
share in Vogel Popcorn. 102 S. Ct. at 832. It is difficult to imagine, however, that Congress
intended for the statute to depend upon such minute distinctions which make no economic
difference.
166. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
167. 102 S. Ct. at 828.
168. In upholding the validity of Treasury Regulation § 1.1563-1(a)(3), the Second Circuit
rejected the taxpayer's argument as a highly strained and convoluted reading of the statute.
The Second Circuit declared:
To read such a requirement into the 80% test would seriously weaken subparagraph
(2)(B) and its 50% test since the 80% requirement if subjected to common owner-
ship on the part of the group of five or fewer, would then tend to overlap or
swallow the 50% requirement.
Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Vogel, 102 S.
Ct. at 833 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the 50% identical ownership test already
serves to measure the overlap between corporations).
169. 440 U.S. 472 (1981).
170. Id. at 477. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
171. The Treasury Department promulgated the regulation in temporary form in March of
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never addressed this factor. Furthermore, the Court failed to recognize that
deference was owed to Regulation 1.1563-1(a)(3) because the Treasury had
consistently applied it since 1971.172
In summary, the Vogel Court premised its holding upon a strained analysis
of the statute's language, history, and purpose and a misapplication of the
National Muffler test. The decision, however, more appropriately reflects
the Court's utilization of an unarticualted higher standard of review for in-
terpretative regulations. Until a definitive standard of review is firmly
established, inconsistent lower court analyses of interpretive regulations is
likely."'
IMPACT
Vogel Court Applies a Higher Standard of Review of Treasury Regulations
Despite the traditional deference afforded contemporaneous interpretative
Treasury Regulations, the Vogel Court afforded little, if any, deference to
Treasury Regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3). The Court's misapplication of
the National Muffler test and its extensive review and strained analysis of
1971 and the regulation constituted the Treasury's first and only construction of the statute.
See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. The lower courts reviewing Treasury Regulation
§ 1.1563-1(a)(3) never disputed its contemporaneity. See, e.g., Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner,
562 F.2d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1977) (emphasizing that the Treasury's contemporaneous construc-
tions of a statute are entitled to great weight); Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65
T.C. 798, 807 (1976)(Simpson, J., dissenting) (Treasury Regulation § 1.1563-1(a)(3) constitutes
a contemporaneous construction of the statute), rev'd per curiam, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977). Cf.
Griswold, supra note 56, at 408-09 (after a few years at the most, a regulation should be ac-
corded great weight to preserve certainty and predictability of the tax laws).
172. The National Muffler Court articulated various factors to consider in reviewing the
validity of a Treasury Regulation including, among others, the length of time the regulation
has been in effect and the consistency of the Commissioner's interpretation. See supra notes
83-86 and accompanying text. The contested regulation in Vogel has been consistently applied
since 1971 and did not come under judicial review until 1976. Furthermore, Congress failed
to act on a 1974 proposed statutory amendment eviscerating the regulation's construction of
the 80% test. See supra note 36. The Vogel Court, however, failed to discuss these factors.
173. In fact, the confusion surrounding the proper standard of judicial review of Treasury
Regulations already exists and is illustrated by the lower courts' inconsistent rulings on the
validity of Treasury Regulation § 1.1561-1(a)(3). See supra note 145. According to a number
of critics, the already existing qualifications to the deference principle allow it to be used as
a means rather than as a true basis for decision. Professor Davis interestingly states:
Unquestionably one of the most important factors in each decision on what weight
to give an interpretive [regulation] is the degree of judicial agreement or disagree-
ment with the [regulation]. When a court agrees with it, the court is likely to utter
words that it is controlling, that it has great weight, or that it must be given effect
unless it is unreasonable or inconsistent with the statute. When the court disagrees,
that is, when the [regulation] seems to the court to be inconsistent with the statute
or calls for a result the court would not reach, the court may take the position
that the interpretive [regulation] is entitled to no weight. Even if the court finds
that the policy embodied in the [regulation] is neither required nor prohibited by
the statute, the court is free to reject the [regulation] if it prefers a different result.
DAVIS, supra note 37, at 60.
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the statute's language, history, and purpose evidence this fact. The Vogel
decision, therefore, suggests that contemporaneous interpretative regulations
which construe an ambiguous statutory definition rather than a broad
statutory term'14 are not entitled to a presumption of validity, and it is unlike-
ly such regulations will be upheld if there are more reasonable interpreta-
tions of the statute in question.
Furthermore, the majority's analysis in Vogel indirectly confirms a recent
trend toward subjecting interpretative regulations to a higher standard of
judicial review.' As the Vogel decision illustrates, the appropriate framework
of review for interpretative regulations considers whether the regulation har-
monizes with the statutes' language, history, and purpose.'76 If it does, the
regulation is reasonable and will be upheld. However, the degree of incon-
sistency and evidence that is needed to invalidate an interpretative regula-
tion inversely depends on the presumption of validity accorded the
regulation.' 7 The factors articulated in National Muffler and the distinction
set forth in Vogel between regulations construing an ambiguous statutory
definition rather than a broad statutory term apparently determine this
presumption.'' In adopting a more scrutinizing standard, however, the Vogel
decision confirms that contemporaneity, a factor accorded particular force
in National Muffler, will no longer invoke a higher level of judicial deference
but is only one of a number of factors to be considered in determining a
regulation's validity.'79 Thus, it will be easier for courts to justify the in-
validation of interpretative regulations.
Finally, the Vogel decision conclusively establishes that interpretative regula-
tions are owed less deference than legislative regulations.' ° Previously,
legislative regulations were accorded the force of law unless they were beyond
the Treasury's delegated authority or unreasonable.'' Because reasonableness
was also the test for interpretative regulations, many courts accorded both
types of regulations the same degree of deference.' 82 The Vogel Court,
174. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
177. Cf. supra note 173 (observing that the inconsistent application of the deference princi-
ple divided the courts on Treasury Regulation § 1.1561-1(a)(3)'s validity); infra notes 183-84
and accompanying text (legislative regulations enjoy a greater presumption of validity and are
thus subject to less judicial review).
178. See, e.g., First Charter Fin. Corp. v. United States, 669 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1982)
(stating that deference is particularly appropriate here since Congress used such language as
to render an interpretive regulation appropriate) (citing Vogel, 101 S. Ct. 1693 (1981)).
179. See supra note 85.
180. See, e.g., First Charter Fin. Corp. v. United States, 669 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1982)
(citing Vogel, 101 S. Ct. 1693 (1981)).
181. See supra notes 1-44 and accompanying text.
182. Arguably, there is no fundamental difference between the Supreme Court's two stan-
dards: legislative regulations carry the force of law unless unreasonable and interpretive regula-
tions must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the statute. Noting
that both legislative regulations and interpretations must be consistent with the statute to be
valid, the Fifth Circuit declared:
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however, explicitly stated that interpretative regulations are owed less
deference than legislative regulations.' 3 Consequently, only legislative regula-
tions will enjoy a substantial presumption of validity and be upheld unless
clearly inconsistent with the revenue statute.' 84
Vogel Narrows Scope of Brother-Sister Controllea' Groups
For more than a decade, the uncertain application of the brother-sister
controlled group eighty percent requirement caused inconsistent treatment
of various Code provisions.'85 The Vogel decision resolved the uncertainty
by holding that a person must own stock in each corporation before being
considered for purposes of the eighty percent test. As a result of Vogel's
common ownership requirement, fewer corporations will be considered com-
ponent members of a brother-sister controlled group."86 Furthermore, Vogel
will have a significant tax impact because numerous Code provisions have
incorporated the brother-sister controlled group definition of section
1563(a)(2).' 7
Closely held corporations which do not satisfy the eighty percent test of
section 1563(a)(2) because of Vogel's common ownership requirement will
no longer have to share a spectrum of tax benefits. These corporations are
We term them "legislative" because they are made pursuant to a specific delega-
tion of authority and often with the particular legislative guidance typically found
in the statutes that spawn only interpretive regulations. But in a real sense they
still interpret or explain existing legislation. The ideal types of legislative and inter-
pretive regulations thus quickly break down in practice.
Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972, 985 n.30 (5th Cir. 1977). See also
DAVIS, supra note 37, § 7:15 (a significant number of cases continue to blur the distinction
between legislative and interpretive regulations); Alexander & Boshkov, Tie Internal Revenue
Service's Ability to Dispose of Cases: General Techniques (Regulations, Rulings and the Like),
31 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 1037, 1039-42 (asserting that the Supreme Court does not appear to make
the distinction controlling).
183. 102 S. Ct. at 827.
184. A comparison of the Court's analysis in Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 101
S. Ct. 1037 (1981), with its analysis in Rowan Cos. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 2288 (1981),
and Vogel demonstrates this conclusion. Applying the National Muffler test, the Court in Rowan
and Vogel extensively reviewed the statute's language, history, and purpose to determine the
validity of an interpretive Treasury Regulation. In both cases, the Court invalidated the regula-
tions even though they were not clearly inconsistent with the statutes. See supra notes 86-95,
146-68 and accompanying text. In Portland, however, the Supreme Court attributed great
deference to legislative regulations. The Court declared that these "regulations command our
respect" and "must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue
statutes." 101 S. Ct. at 1045 (quoting Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S.
496, 501 (1948)). Furthermore, the Portland Court did not extensively examine the statute's
language, history, and purpose, but sustained the regulations because they were neither
"unreasonable on their face [nlor inconsistent with the Code." 101 S. Ct. at 1045.
185. In view of the conflicting case law prior to Vogel, one commentator declared that it
was difficult to advise clients on the proper application of the various Code sections incor-
porating the brother-sister controlled group definition of § 1563(a)(2). Weisman, supra note
36, at 485. For a list of other Code provisions dependent upon § 1563(a), see supra note 3.
186. See infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 3.
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now entitled to 8 a full accumulated earnings credit,' 9 investment credit,' 90
and the benefits of the graduated corporate tax structure.' 9 ' The graduated
corporate tax structure alone can reduce a corporation's taxes by $19,750
in 1982 and $20,250 in future years.' 2 Not only are these benefits available
prospectively, but corporations previously denied these benefits because of
Treasury Regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3) can file refund claims'93 for all
open back years.' 94
In addition, the Court's narrow construction of section 1563(a)(2)(A)
enables a number of closely held corporations to avoid brother-sister con-
trolled group status by restructuring their stock ownership.'" This is par-
ticularly true when a person or a small group of individuals own slightly
more than eighty percent of two or more corporations and the remaining
stock interest of each corporation is held separately by unrelated investors.
For example, assume entrepreneur A owns eighty percent of three separate
corporations. The remaining outstanding stock of each corporation is held
188. For other tax benefits shared by members of a brother-sister controlled group, see supra
note 3.
189. I.R.C. § 535(c)(2)(B) allows certain service corporations a $150,000 accumulated earn-
ings credit and I.R.C. §§ 535(c)(2)(A) and (c)(3) allow all other corporations a $250,000 ac-
cumulated earnings credit. I.R.C. § 535(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982). Section 1561(a)(2), however,
restricts a "controlled group of corporations" to one accumulated earnings credit. I.R.C.
§ 1561(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
190. I.R.C. § 46(a)(6) limits a "controlled group" of corporations as defined in § 1563(a)
to a single investment credit. I.R.C. § 46(a)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
191. Section 1561(a)(1) treats a controlled group of corporations as defined in § 1563(a) as
a single taxpayer for purposes of the graduated tax rates. I.R.C. § 1561(a)(1) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1982). The benefits of the lower tax rates are divided equally among the corporate members,
unless they agree to an appointment plan providing otherwise. Id. The corporate graduated
tax rates are reprinted at supra note 2. Prior to 1978 when the normal and surtax rate structure
was in effect, I.R.C. § 1561(a)(1) limited a controlled group of corporations to a single surtax
exemption. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
192. The graduated corporate tax structure imposes a maximum tax rate of 46% on all cor-
porate earnings in excess of $100,000. The tax savings quoted in the text represent the dif-
ference between applying the maximum 46% tax rate and the lower tax rates applicable to
the first $100,000 of corporate earnings. For a discussion of the applicable tax rates, see supra
note 2.
193. A refund claim notifies the Internal Revenue Service that the taxpayer has overpaid
taxes and seeks a refund. The refund claim must be filed within the applicable period of limita-
tion, see infra note 201, and with the service center serving the Internal Revenue district in
which the tax was paid. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(a)(2) (1982). However, if the tax was paid
to the Director of Internal Operations the claim must be filed there. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(a)(2).
Furthermore, a corporate taxpayer filing a refund claim after June 30, 1976 for an overpay-
ment of income taxes, must use Form 1120X, "Amended U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return."
Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(3)(1982). For all other refund claims Form 843 must be utilized.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(c).
194. Refund claims filed after the expiration of the prescribed statute of limitations are in-
valid. I.R.C. § 6511 (b)(l) (Law. Co-op. 1980). In general, a corporate taxpayer may file a
refund claim within three years from the time the return was filed or within two years from
the time the tax was paid, whichever period expires later. Id. § 6511(a). If no return is filed,
the refund claim must be filed within two years from the time the tax was paid. Id.
195. See generally Golub & Weber, supra note 3, at 211 (article cites examples illustrating
various capital arrangements to avoid brother-sister controlled group status).
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separately by B, C, and D, respectively.' 9 These corporations can escape
classification as component members of a brother-sister controlled group by
reducing A's stock ownership below eighty percent'97 in any two of the three
corporations.'9 8 Under Vogel's construction of section 1563(a)(2)(A), B, C,
and D's stock interest would not be included in computing the eighty per-
cent test because they do not own stock in each corporation. A's stock in-
terest alone is insufficient to satisfy the eighty percent test because A owns
less than eighty percent in two of the corporations.
Similar capital arrangements may now be considered whenever a small en-
trepreneur group decides to initiate a new business or expand its present
enterprise.' 9 The substantial tax benefits enhance the feasibility of forming
multiple corporations.. and of allowing unrelated outside investors to own
slightly more than twenty percent of each corporation.2"' For example, A
and B respectively own sixty percent and forty percent of an incorporated
196. The following chart illustrates the application of I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) to the facts stated
in the text.
Percentage of Stock Percentage of
Ownership Identical Stock Ownership
(80% Test) (50% Test)
CORPORATIONS
SHAREHOLDERS 1 2 3
A 80 80 80 80
B 20 - -
C 20 -
D - - 20
TOTAL 80 80 80 80
All three corporations are members of a brother-sister controlled group as defined in I.R.C.
§ 1563(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1974). A's 80% stock ownership in each corporation satisfies the
80% and 50% tests. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
197. A's stock interest can be reduced by redemption (i.e. sale of stock to the issuing cor-
poration) or sale of stock to an outside party. The outside party must be unrelated to A or
I.R.C. § 1563(e) would attribute A with indirect ownership of the stock. See supra note 7.
198. Nevertheless, the tax advantages of multiple incorporation may still be denied under
the traditional subjective provisions of I.R.C. §§ 269, 482, and 1551. See supra notes 18-20
and accompanying text. Arguably, however, § 1551 is also inapplicable here because it utilizes
the identical two part test adopted in § 1563(a)(2). Although no case has yet considered whether
§ 155 l(b)(2) contains a common ownership requirement, the Vogel decision is persuasive authority
that it does.
199. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the tax considera-
tions involved in multiple incorporation, see DeLeoleos, Are You Making the Proper Elections
in Dealing with Related Corporate Groups?, 24 J. TAX'N 270 (1966); Dreher, Federal Income
Tax Aspects of Multiple Corporations, 9 Hous. L. REv. 8, 9-14 (1971); Eustice, Corporations
and Corporate Investors, 25 TAX. L. REv. 509, 560 (1970).
In addition, there are many non-tax considerations involved in the multiple incorporation
decision. See supra note 19. One major non-tax consideration is the need for increased limited
liability. For example, it may be advisable for a corporation to market a risky new product
through a separate corporation. In certain situations, however, a parent corporation may be
liable for the debts of its wholly-owned subsidiary. For a general discussion of the limited
liability factor, see I O'NEAL, supra note 19, §§ 1.10, 2.05.
201. Besides the tax considerations, there are numerous other factors that should be con-
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clothing store. They plan to open a similiar incorporated business at a dif-
ferent location. Classification as component members of a brother-sister con-
trolled group can be avoided by issuing slightly more than twenty percent
of the new corporation's stock to an outside investor. Because only a greater
than twenty percent outside interest is needed to avoid controlled group status,
A and B are able to maintain control of each corporation, yet escape tax
limitations placed on a brother-sister controlled group.2"2 Prior to Vogel,
a fifty percent or more outside stock interest was required to achieve the
same results.
CONCLUSION
The majority's analysis in Vogel confirms a recent trend subjecting inter-
pretative Treasury Regulations to a higher standard of judicial review. The
Vogel Court invalidated a contemporaneous Treasury Regulation even though
it was not clearly inconsistent with the statute's language, history, and pur-
pose. The Court emphasized that less deference was required because the
regulation was interpretative rather than legislative and it construed an am-
biguous statutory definition rather than a broad statutory term. Although
a higher standard of review is commendable in view of the growing distrust
of administrative agencies, the Vogel majority misconstrued the language,
history, and purpose of section 1563(a)(2) to avoid explicating this new stan-
dard. Consequently, the Vogel decision may lead to inconsistent analyses of
interpretative regulations in the future.
Additionally, the Vogel decision clarified the application of the brother-
sister controlled group definition in holding that the eighty percent test of
section 1563(a)(2) contains a common ownership requirement. As a result
of the Court's narrow construction, fewer corporations will be considered
members of a brother-sister controlled group. These corporations will no
longer be forced to share the spectrum of tax benefits available to small
corporations. Futhermore, a group of closely held corporations may now
avoid brother-sister controlled group status by allowing outside investors to
separately own more than twenty percent of each corporation.
Joseph P. Karczewski
sidered in determining whether to finance a new corporation through debt or equity funding.
For a thorough discussion of the financing alternative available to a closely held corporation,
see I O'NEAL, supra note 19, §§ 2.08-2.17. For a general discussion of what a lawyer should
know about the financing of small businesses, see S. FLINK, EQUITY FINANCING FOR SMALL
BUSINESS (1962); Lehrman, The Problems of Small Business Financing, 1 TEX. So. INTRAMURAL
L. REV. 139 (1970); Newman, The Anatomy of Commercial Financing, 61 A.B.A. J. 352 (1975).
202. For example, if 25% of the new corporation's voting stock is issued to an outside in-
vestor, A and B together will be able to control the corporation since collectively they hold
75% of its voting stock.
To safeguard against future dissension between A and B, however, and to insure that neither
will subsequently side with the outside investor, A and B should enter a shareholder's agree-
ment or some other voting control device. For an extensive discussion of the use of such various
devices, see I O'NEAL, supra note 19, §§ 5.01-5.39.
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